




# EthWord

## Deploying PayWord on Ethereum


M. Elsheikh  
Amr Youssef  
Jeremy Clark

# Bitcoin's Pedigree

RAYANAN AN



you've read about familiarity with a cryptography, you the following imp of research on di Baum, 10,12 did not lead required a central system, and no bank bitcoin, a radically d cryptocurrency that finally succeeded. Nakamoto, was an resemblance to ea This article cha all of the technical the academic liter 1). This is not to di



## Mondex: Post-Mortem

- Many trials including Guelph, Ontario
- Lost, stolen, malfunctioning cards created issues
- Wallet was clunky & slow, retailers hated having multiple terminals
- Smart card technology -> Chip & PIN

## Lecture 12 – History of Cryptocurrencies [Bonus lecture]

16,908 views    132 likes    8 comments    SHARE    ...

**B** Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies Online Course  
Published on Sep 2, 2015    **SUBSCRIBE 18K**

Bonus lecture by Jeremy Clark due to popular interest.

Pre-Bitcoin	Post-Bitcoin
Auditable, anonymous electronic cash [Sander & Ta-Shma]	ZeroCoin, etc [Miers et al]
Lottery Payments [Rivest] [Wheeler] [Jarecki & Odlyzko]	Micropayments for decentralized currencies [Pass, Shelat]
An efficient distributed currency [Laurie]	RSCoin [Danezis & Meiklejohn]

Pre-Bitcoin	Post-Bitcoin
<p>Auditable, anonymous electronic cash [Sander &amp; Ta-Shma]</p>	<p>ZeroCoin, etc [Miers et al]</p>
<p>Lottery Payments [Rivest] [Wheeler] [Jarecki &amp; Odlyzko]</p>	<p>Micropayments for decentralized currencies [Pass, shelat]</p>
<p>An efficient distributed currency [Laurie]</p>	<p>RSCoin [Danezis &amp; Meiklejohn]</p>
<p>PayWord [Rivest &amp; Shamir]</p>	

Pre-Bitcoin	Post-Bitcoin
Auditable, anonymous electronic cash [Sander & Ta-Shma]	ZeroCoin, etc [Miers et al]
Lottery Payments [Rivest] [Wheeler] [Jarecki & Odlyzko]	Micropayments for decentralized currencies [Pass, shelat]
An efficient distributed currency [Laurie]	RSCoin [Danezis & Meiklejohn]
PayWord [Rivest & Shamir]	EthWord [You are here]

# PayWord and MicroMint: Two Simple Micropayment Schemes

Ronald L. Rivest<sup>1</sup> and Adi Shamir<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, 545 Technology Square, Cambridge, Mass.  
02139, rivest@theory.lcs.mit.edu

<sup>2</sup> Weizmann Institute of Science, Applied Mathematics Department, Rehovot, Israel,  
shamir@theory.lcs.mit.edu

## Two Simple Micropayment Schemes

### 1 Introduction

We present two simple micropayment schemes, "PayWord" and "MicroMint," for making small purchases over the Internet. We were inspired to work on this problem by DEC's "Millicent" scheme [10]. Surveys of some electronic payment schemes can be found in Hallam-Baker [6], Schneier [16], and Wayner [18].

Our main goal is to minimize the number of public-key operations required, using hash operations instead whenever possible. As a rough guide, the proposed schemes are about 100 times faster than RSA signature generation, and verify 200 signatures per second, whereas the

# Hash


## PayWord and MicroMint: Two Simple Micropayment Schemes

Ronald L. Rivest<sup>1</sup> and Adi Shamir<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, 545 Technology Square, Cambridge, Mass.  
02139, rivest@theory.lcs.mit.edu

<sup>2</sup> Weizmann Institute of Science, Applied Mathematics Department, Rehovot, Israel,  
shamir@theory.lcs.mit.edu

### Introduction



We present two simple micropayment schemes, “PayWord” and “MicroMint,” for making small purchases over the Internet. We were inspired to work on this problem by DEC’s “Millicent” scheme[10]. Surveys of some electronic payment schemes can be found in Hallam-Baker [6], Schneier[16], and Wayner[18].

Our main goal is to minimize the number of public-key operations required, using hash operations instead whenever possible. As a rough guide, about 100 times faster than RSA signature generation, and roughly the same as RSA signature verification: on a typical workstation, we can generate 200 signatures per second, and verify 200 signatures per second.


# Iterative Hash

## PayWord and MicroMint: Two Simple Micropayment Schemes

Ronald L. Rivest<sup>1</sup> and Adi Shamir<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, 545 Technology Square, Cambridge, Mass. 02139, rivest@theory.lcs.mit.edu

<sup>2</sup> Weizmann Institute of Science, Applied Mathematics Department, Rehovot, Israel, shamir@theory.lcs.mit.edu



**Introduction**

We present two simple micropayment schemes, “PayWord” and “MicroMint,” for making small purchases over the Internet. We were inspired to work on this problem by DEC’s “Millicent” [10]. Surveys of some electronic payment schemes can be found in Hallam-Baker [6], Schneier [16], and Wayner [18]. Our main goal is to minimize the number of public-key operations required. Payment, using hash operations instead whenever possible. As a rough guide, about 100 times faster than RSA signature generation; on a typical workstation, we can generate 200 signatures per second, and verify 200 signatures per second.



# Hash Chain

## PayWord and MicroMint: Two Simple Micropayment Schemes

Ronald L. Rivest<sup>1</sup> and Adi Shamir<sup>2</sup>

- <sup>1</sup> MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, 545 Technology Square, Cambridge, Mass. 02139, rivest@theory.lcs.mit.edu
- <sup>2</sup> Weizmann Institute of Science, Applied Mathematics Department, Rehovot, Israel, shamir@theory.lcs.mit.edu




# Hash Chain



# Hash Chain






# Hash Chain



# PayWord










Z

preimage = \$1 ea





Y = \$3















Z

preimage = \$1 ea





Y = \$3



$H^3(Y) = Z?$

Y = \$3





Z

preimage = \$1 ea



Y = \$3



$H^3(Y) = Z?$

Y = \$3




# EthWord

DApp

preimage = \$1 ea



preimage = \$1 ea



$Y = \$3$

$H^3(Y) = Z?$

$Y = \$3$



$X \rightarrow \text{Hash} \rightarrow Y \rightarrow \text{Hash} \rightarrow Y \rightarrow \text{Hash} \rightarrow Y \rightarrow \text{Hash} \rightarrow Z$

DApp

preimage = \$1 ea  
\$100  
Z



Z  
preimage = \$1 ea




Y = \$3



$H^3(Y) = Z?$


Y = \$3



```

DApp
preimage = $1 ea
      $100
      Z
Claim(Pay, Y):
  if HPay(Y) = Z {
    Pay -> Bob
    (100-Pay) -> Alice
  }


```



Z  
preimage = \$1 ea



Y = \$3



*H<sup>3</sup>(Y) = Z?*

Y = \$3



DApp

```
preimage = $1 ea  
           $100  
           Z
```

```
Claim(Pay, Y):  
  if HPay(Y) = Z {  
    Pay -> Bob  
    (100-Pay) -> Alice  
  }
```

# Payment Channel?



DApp

```
preimage = $1 ea  
          $100  
          Z
```

```
Claim(Pay, Y):  
  if HPay(Y) = Z {  
    Pay -> Bob  
    (100-Pay) -> Alice  
  }
```

# Payment Channel?

Offline / Monotonic /  
Unidirectional

DApp

```
preimage = $1 ea  
          $100  
          Z
```

```
Claim(Pay, Y):  
  if HPay(Y) = Z {  
    Pay -> Bob  
    (100-Pay) -> Alice  
  }
```

# Payment Channel?

~~Bitcoin~~

Ethereum

DApp

```
preimage = $1 ea  
           $100  
           Z
```

```
Claim(Pay, Y):  
  if HPay(Y) = Z {  
    Pay -> Bob  
    (100-Pay) -> Alice  
  }
```

# Payment Channel?

# ~~Digital Signatures~~

# Hash

DApp

```
preimage = $1 ea  
          $100  
          Z
```

```
Claim(Pay, Y):  
  if HPay(Y) = Z {  
    Pay -> Bob  
    (100-Pay) -> Alice  
  }
```

# Payment Channel?

## ~~Digital Signatures~~

## Hash & msg.sender

DApp

```
preimage = $1 ea  
          $100  
          Z
```

```
Claim(Pay, Y):  
  if HPay(Y) = Z {  
    Pay -> Bob  
    (100-Pay) -> Alice  
  }
```

Payment Channel?

*Very Compact*

112 -> 256 bits

# Ethereum Payment Channel in 50 Lines of Code



Matthew Di Ferrante

Follow

Jun 5, 2017 · 4 min read

With the talk of state/payment channels being a “future” scalability option in Ethereum, I wanted to write a contract to show that they’re more than doable now. You don’t need to wait for Raiden, you can set up your own trustless channels right now.


I’ll walk through the solidity code in `channel.sol` here:


<https://github.com/mattdf/payment-channel>

Let’s say Alice and Bob want to set up a payment channel for something that requires micropayments that they don’t want to commit on chain to save on transaction fees. In this case, Bob may be paying Alice to manage a social media presence, and he pays her 0.001 ETH per tweet (24 cents) —if Bob were to make an on-chain transaction for each tweet, 20% of Alice’s income would be eaten up by fees.

On one hand, Alice does not want to do 100 tweets of work and trust Bob will pay her at the end for all 100 tweets, and on the other hand, Bob doesn’t want to pay Alice for 100 tweets all at once for her to just disappear and not do any work.

channel where Bob commits  
the money







EthWord Function	Gas	ETH	USD
Channel	312 031	0.00539	\$0.689
closeChannel (50)	18 905	0.00033	\$0.042
closeChannel (100)	22 205	0.00038	\$0.049


EthWord Function	Gas	ETH	USD
Channel	312 031	0.00539	\$0.689
closeChannel (50)	18 905	0.00033	\$0.042
closeChannel (100)	22 205	0.00038	\$0.049



5% fee -> settle for amounts ~\$15

1% fee -> settle for amounts ~\$75




Trickle






Untrusted  
Intermediary

# Other payment channel results? Open research



Untrusted  
Intermediary



@PulpSpy